While Russia and China have vociferously condemned the US operation in Venezuela to take the country’s strongman, Nicolas Maduro, into custody, Central Asian governments are adopting a restrained approach to the latest demonstration of American gunboat diplomacy.
Oil interests appear to be a factor in shaping international reactions.No Central Asian state as of January 5 has issued an official reaction to Maduro’s capture and the apparent US intention to take control of Venezuela’s oil industry.
They have little incentive to do so, given the Trump administration’s heightened interest in engaging with the region: President Trump has even invited Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and his Uzbek counterpart Shavkat Mirziyoyev to the G20 summit in 2026.
To criticize, then, risks upending the positive dynamic in relations with the United States, while any expression of support for US actions would be sure to elicit displeasure in Moscow and Beijing. “The main thing is to maintain stability and prudence, observing events from the sidelines,” a Kazakh news outlet, Arasha.kz, cited a regional expert, Marat Shibutov, as saying.
He was referring specifically to Kazakhstan, but implicitly his view covers all Central Asian states.The Russian Foreign Ministry, meanwhile, issued a barrage of statements assailing the Trump administration’s “aggressive actions,” and the “unacceptable encroachment on the sovereignty of an independent state.” A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson said the “hegemonic acts of the US seriously violate international law.” Subsequently, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi condemned Washington for acting like a “global judge.” Underpinning the regional reaction to the geopolitical earthquake in Venezuela is concern about the implications for global energy markets.
In Kazakhstan, Central Asia’s leading oil producer, expert analysis is mixed, seeing no near-term impact on Kazakh oil exports and revenues, while raising concerns about potential longer-term consequences.
According to some estimates, Venezuela possesses up to 20 percent of the world’s proven oil reserves.At its peak in the late 1990s, the country produced roughly 3.5 million barrels per day.
But dilapidated infrastructure and other factors now limit production to under 1 million bpd.Trump has vowed that US energy companies will restore Venezuela’s infrastructure and production capacity without articulating a clear-cut plan to do so.
Central Asian energy analysts believe maximizing the South American state’s production potential will take years and require billions in investment.Opinion differs on the near-term price of oil following the US move. “The key problem with Venezuelan oil lies in its quality: it is very viscous, more difficult to extract, and the cost is high.
Therefore, a rapid increase in production there is almost physically impossible,” the Forbes.kz outlet quoted Askar Ismailov, an analyst at the Geneva-based Global Gas Centre, as saying. “It is not profitable for the Americans to simply give away market share, but they will not flood’ the market at a loss either,” Ismailov added, predicting that prices would remain comparatively stable in the immediate term.
Baurzhan Shurmanov, a Kazakh economist, believes that prices could fluctuate somewhat, depending mainly on political developments that could foster supply uncertainty.Shurmanov, in comments published by the Kazakh outlet Arbat.Media, said that if Venezuela eventually revives daily production to 3-3.5 million bpd, such a development could “alter the balance of power” in energy markets.
US control of the Venezuelan oil sector can have an immediate and profound impact on the primary recipients of exports today Cuba and China.Uncertainty now hovers over the billions that China has invested in Venezuela’s oil sector over the past decade.
Beijing imported approximately 470,000 bpd of Venezuelan oil in 2025, according to Reuters, while Cuba covers roughly 40 percent of its energy import needs with Venezuelan crude.A cutoff of shipments would hit Cuba particularly hard, recreating conditions reminiscent of the “special period” in the mid-1990s.
An analysis published by Zakon.kz outlet portrayed the US power play in Venezuela as “the most significant geopolitical upheaval of the decade,” adding that if Venezuelan production increases by 1.5 million bpd from current levels it could become “a powerful deterrent to price increases.” Prices could drop to $50-$55 per barrel.
That would be very bad news for Russia, and to a lesser extent, Kazakhstan.Shurmanov indicated that a significant expansion of Venezuelan supplies, and stable prices in the $50- range, could reduce “some of [Kazakhstan’s] significance as a supplier,” while putting a significant dent in state revenues.
Elsewhere, sanctioned Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska warned the US takeover of Venezuela’s oil is a potentially calamitous development for Russian leader Vladimir Putin, whose government relies heavily on oil and gas revenues to maintain an authoritarian system at home and the country’s war effort in Ukraine.
Looking beyond the grinding war of attrition in Ukraine, which has already drained Russia of a lot of its fiscal resilience, the potential losses to the state budget from a $50 per barrel price could cause the Putinist system to teeter. “Our sacred state capitalism will find it difficult to leave everything as it is: not to cut costs, not to get rid of non-core assets, and to continue engaging in grandiose projects without the necessary competencies and without the participation of private business to develop competition,” Deripaska wrote on his Telegram channel.
He went on to indicate that Putin is already squeezing “private business” to cover state revenue gaps.In the coming year, he predicted that businesses will shoulder the “main burden” of taxation, thus stifling growth and sowing discontent in Russia’s business and finance sectors.